A little over twenty years ago, a group of scientists assembled in Asilomar, California, to consider the consequences of the newly invented techniques of genetic engineering, or recombinant DNA, as it later came to be called. There was in place a moratorium recommended by scientists and which we, working for the UK's Medical Research Council, had been instructed to heed by the Secretary of the organization. It was then that I came to appreciate the depth of the distinction between chastity and impotence, which I had used some years previously to convince my supervisor, Sir Cyril Hinshelwood, that bacteriophage resistance arose by mutation in E. coli, a process he seriously doubted at the time. The outcome is the same, but the reasons are profoundly different.
Fortunately, at Asilomar, scientists voted to terminate the moratorium, and, in exchange, offered to proceed cautiously and try to find conditions for the safe practice of gene manipulation. This occupied the attention of many able scientists for several years thereafter. If nothing were to survive from that decade other than the proceedings of committee meetings, the reports of commissions of enquiries, press reports and books, future historians would convince themselves that a new religious cult suddenly appeared first in California, later sweeping the world with intricate theological works that encompassed not only everything on earth but future human evolution as well.
Eventually a scheme was produced in the US, the NIH guidelines, parts of which were plainly absurd. For example, the guidelines required that the pathogenicity of the organism providing the DNA be taken into account; thus DNA from the malaria plasmodium required higher containment for cloning than DNA from Tetrahymena. Nobody was allowed to consider how the original pathogenicity might be reconstituted from a bunch of DNA clones, and, if one took this seriously, lion DNA would need more stringent containment than pussycat DNA, lions being much more pathogenic for humans than their domestic cousins. It took quite a long time to convince people that the best way to deal with a dangerous virus would be to clone it and lock it up in E. coli or lambda bacteriophage rather than working with the virus itself.
All of this generated a discussion of what could be called artificial pathogenesis. Could we create, intentionally or by accident, entirely new elements that were worse than anything found in nature? I wrote a paper on this subject (which was published by Her Majesty's Stationery Office as an appendix to the Annual Report of a Committee) in which I tried to invent novel pathogens which could be realistically produced.
My favourite example was to clone the gene for ricin (a toxin famous at that time; see paper in Bulgarian J Murd. & Assass.) in lambda bacteriophage and propagate it as a lysogen in E. coli. Many years later, it turned out that I was not all that original, when it was discovered that a toxin from Shigella (a close relative of E. coli) was a homologue of ricin, and what is more, the gene was carried in a lambdoid bacteriophage. This serves to illustrate that the limits of pathogenesis are not set by putting genes together; novel gene encounters will happen, albeit rarely, even across species. What is more important is how well these agents do in the outside world. The problem is not about genes but about the environment. Man has created more good and also wreaked more havoc by environmental intervention than by tinkering with genes in a laboratory.
Today we have another good example of a novel pathogen that was not created by scientists, but is of natural origin and which has produced a new disease entirely through social means. Bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) has reached us because we have eaten cows that have eaten other cows that ate sheep, in which the disease is endemic. Most scientists considered prions, the protein infectious elements that cause scrapie and BSE, to be improbable; many thought that even though radiation inactivation of scrapie seemingly excluded the presence of nucleic acid, some would eventually be found lurking in a hidden recess in the protein complex. In fact, as long ago as 1967, John Griffiths recognized that it was theoretically possible for a protein to generate more of itself by turning on a gene that produced it. Modern theories of prions have the bad protein converting a good normal protein into the bad state by some structural means.
Because prions can be transmitted by eating them, human prion diseases would become epidemic if cannabilism was widely practised. To prevent BSE in cows, all we have had to do is stop involuntary cannibalism amongst herbivores, despite the considerable economic and social consequences.
Not only are scientists blameless for creating the 'new' prion diseases, they probably couldn't have done so if they had tried, especially without knowing of the existence of prions in nature. I therefore urge that we enjoy our impotence by calling for a moratorium on research leading to the creation of prions.
